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Abstract: With the introduction of web services, users 
require an automated way of determining their reliability
and even their matching to personal and subjective pref-
erences. Therefore, trust modelling of web services, man-
aged in an autonomous way by intelligent agents, is a
challenging and relevant issue. Due to the dynamic and
distributed nature of web services, recommendations of
web services from third parties may also play an important
role to build and update automated trust models. In this
context, the agent reputation and trust (ART) testbed has
been used to compare trust models in three international
competitions. The testbed runs locally and defines an ART
appraisal domain with a simulation engine, although the
trust models may be applied to any kind of automated and
remote services, such as web services. Our previous works
proposed an already-published trust model called AFRAS
that used fuzzy sets to represent reputation of service
providers and of recommenders of such services. In this
paper we describe the extension required in the trust model
to participate in these competitions. The extension consists
of a trust strategy that applies the AFRAS trust model to
the ART testbed concepts and protocols. An implementa-
tion of this extension of AFRAS trust model has partici-
pated in the (Spanish and International) 2006 ART
competitions. Using this ART platform and some of the
agents who participated, we executed a set of ART games
to evaluate the relevance of trust strategy over trust model,
and the advantage of using fuzzy representation of trust and 
reputation.
Keywords: Trust and reputation of services, 
Autonomous agents,  Fuzzy sets
1 Introduction
As the amount of information in the web via html pages,
wikis, blogs, and other documents grows, it gets more
difficult to distinguish accurate information from inaccu-
rate or untrustworthy information. A search engine query
usually results in outdated and/or unreliable informations
and the user is forced to choose manually what she/he
considers the most reliable source based on her/his trust
requirements. With the introduction of web services, the
problem is further more complex since users have to deal
with the satisfaction of their particular set of requirements
for trusting recommendations about web services and web
services themselves. Due to the amount and complexity of
services and requirements, this task requires a more auto-
mated way of trusting each other. Two approaches to the
problem of how to implement this automated computing of
trust was given by Conte and Paolucci (2002): the emer-
gent and the designed trust. Designed trust is inferred from
explicit norms and social institutions observe the compli-
ance of such norms. This view consists of a central entity
that certifies the satisfaction of some given evaluation
criteria. Trust is then a global property shared by all the
observers. This centralized nature of trust is due to the size
of these scenarios, where repeated interactions has low
probability.
On the other hand, distributed approaches tackle with
emergent trust, where no objective evaluation criteria are
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universally accepted and the possibility of repeated meet-
ings is not so low (Josang et al. 2007). Unlike designed
models of trust, with subjective evaluations, pair-wise
cooperation emerges from a spontaneous process in the
form of communications about others’ behaviour. In recent
years, the need for computing emergent trust has become
very clear. In this regard autonomous agents issuing rec-
ommendations are acknowledged as a key tool, since they
would enable users to automatically select those services
that match their own specific personal preferences. In other
words, the solution consists of autonomous agents that
form opinions about other agents based on their past ser-
vices provided, as well as from references about them from
third-party agents (playing the role of recommenders of
such providers) in order to improve the quality of future
trust decisions (Ramchurn et al. 2004). This solution can
be applied to web services even if the agents are not web
agents, as it is our case, but agents could be also web agents
since, for instance, one of the most popular agent devel-
opment platform [JADE (Bellifemine et al. 2001, 2007)]
provides support for bidirectional invocation of Web ser-
vices from agents, and agent services from Web service
clients.
The way those opinions are formed is often called trust
model, although sometimes the application of those opin-
ions in decisions related to future interactions with other
agents is also considered part of the trust model. In order to
avoid confusion, we will call trust strategy to the applica-
tion of the trust model.
Due to the relevance of this issue in the desired broad
use of agent technology, a number of trust models and
strategies have been proposed. Most of them are compu-
tational models that involve a numerical decision-making
made up of utility functions, probabilities, and evaluations
of past interactions (Yu and Singh 2000; Zacharia and Maes
2000; Sabater and Sierra 2001; Sen et al. 2000; Huynh et al.
2006). But from the artificial intelligence point of view,
trust models embedded in agents should involve a
cognitive approach (Marsh 1994): enriching the internal
model of making cooperative and competitive
decisions rather than enriching the exchanged reputation
information. In other words, they intend to explicitly
reproduce the reasoning mechanisms behind human deci-
sion-making.
Among the researchers who have proposed a socio-
cognitive view of trust we could cite (Schillo and Rovatsos
2000; Castellfranchi and Falcone 1998) and (Braynov and
Sandholm 2002). Schillo’s model (Schillo and Rovatsos
2000) distinguish according to two types of motivation of
trust: honesty and altruism of each agent. A more enriched
model is from Castellfranchi and Falcone (1998) who
claim that some other beliefs rather than reputation are
essential to compute the amount of trust on a particular
agent: its competence (ability to act as we wish), willing-
ness (intention to cooperate), persistence (consistency
along time), and motivation (our contribution to its goals).
Brainov and Sandholm (2002) highlight the relevance of
modelling opponent’s trust, since both agents would be
interested in showing the trustworthiness of the counterpart
to allocate resources efficiently.
As we have seen, very different points of view have
been taken into account in trust models. These difference
remark the necessity of a fair and universal (rather than ad-
hoc) way to compare between proposed trust models and
strategies. This is the intention of several international
researchers who developed an agent reputation and trust
testbed (ART) (Fullam et al. 2005a) that allow researchers
to perform competitive games with objective metrics.
Using such testbed, three international competitions were
successfully carried out jointly with the AAMAS interna-
tional Conferences of 2006, 2007, and 2008 in Hakodate
(Japan), Honolulu (USA), and Estoril (Portugal), respec-
tively. During these years the ART testbed has been widely
accepted by part of the research community, while the
ART-testbed members have discussed, patched, and
updated the platform using the feedback from the Com-
petitions (Team 2007b) and from the agent trust commu-
nity (Team 2007a). These discussions also produced some
changes in protocols (Sabater et al. 2008), and outlined
new directions of work (Gomez et al. 2007).
The intention of this paper is to explain how we extend
the AFRAS model to be applied into ART testbed games,
and to show how it would behave if some of these apparent
shortcomings of ART testbed were considered. In order to
achieve these goals, Sect. 2 includes an outline of the main
related work: ART testbed in Subsect. 2.1 and the basics of
our previously-published fuzzy trust model AFRAS in
Subsect. 2.2. After that, Sect. 3 will give details about the
extension applied into this AFRAS trust model in order to
participate in ART competitions, which is the main con-
tribution of this paper. Next, in Sect. 4, we will explain the
games specifically designed (using ART testbed) to eval-
uate the relevance of trust strategy over trust model, and
the advantage of using fuzzy representation of trust
and reputation. Finally we will outline some conclusions
and the planned future work on this issue.
2 Related work
2.1 Agent reputation and trust testbed
The ART testbed compared different trust/reputation
models and strategies in an art appraisal domain. A general
outline of ART interactions can be observed in Fig. 1,
obtained from (Fullam et al. 2005a). In this domain, the
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agents are the players/competitors that appraise paintings, 
while clients that own paintings to be appraised, instead of 
being autonomous agents, are emulated by the simulation 
engine (Fig. 2 from source (Fullam et al. 2005b))
In each timestep, a simulation engine presents each
appraiser agent with paintings (generated by the simula-
tion engine) to be appraised, paying a fixed amount
(ClientFee) for each appraisal request. Very close valu-
ation of paintings to their real value would lead to more
future clients, and therefore to more earnings (called
BankBalance) to win the competition. Each painting
belongs to an era among a finite set of possible artistic
eras while agents have different levels of expertise
(ability to appraise) in each artistic eras. An agent can
appraise its own paintings and may request opinions (at a
fixed cost called OpinionCost) from other appraisers to
get its valuation of the painting close to the real value
(specially in the eras, where the agent has low expertise).
An agent can also act as provider of appraisals in
response to opinion (about paintings) requests from other
agents. Additionally, an agent can similarly request rep-
utation information about other appraisers (at a fixed and
much lower cost than opinions called ReputationCost).
According to the description given above, an agent may
obtain earnings in three possible situations: when clients
submit paintings to appraise to the agents; when agents
sell opinions; when agents sell reputations. Agents have
expenses when they buy opinions or reputations. This
definition of the scenario guarantees that agents earn
more BankBalance if:
1. They manage to become trusted providers of opinions
and reputations,
2. They are able to learn as quick as possible to identify
agents that can provide them with good opinions/
reputations and
3. They adapt quickly to its models in cases, where the
other agents change their behaviours.
Since an ART game is organized as a sequence of
opinion and reputation transactions we will see below an
explanation of these protocols in detail.
2.1.1 Opinion transaction protocol
The opinion transaction protocol suffered changes in 2008
competition1 from the original specification of the testbed
Fig. 1 ART domain outline
Fig. 2 The role of simulation engine in the ART testbed
1 Changes for the 2008 Competition: http://megatron.iiia.csic.es/art-
testbed/changes_2008.htm
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(Fullam et al. 2005a). The final opinion transaction dia-
logue consists of two independent distinct protocols
(Fig. 3).
• The first one is dedicated to ask for a certainty value of
an agent in a given artistic era (where certainty refers to
an assessment of agent expertise in that era). This
certainty protocol begins when a requester agent sends
a ‘certainty request’ message to another appraiser agent
(noted as provider in advance), identifying the era of
the painting to be appraised. Upon receiving the
certainty request, if the potential provider is willing to
provide the requested information, it responds by
sending a ‘certainty reply’ message with the corre-
sponding certainty assessment about the opinion it
could provide about paintings of that era, defined as a
real number between zero and one.
• The second protocol corresponds to the opinion trans-
action itself, where the opinion requester sends pay-
ment to the provider if it chooses to ask for an opinion
from the provider.
Since direct communications between agents are not
allowed, the simulation engine is in charge of forwarding
such certainty and opinion messages, implementing both
payments, and producing the opinions according to the
corresponding expertise of the agents and to the will to
provide a truthful opinion (expressed in a numerical value).
However, certainty assessment is generated by the agents
rather than produced by the simulation engine.
2.1.2 Reputation transaction protocol
Additionally, appraiser agents can exchange reputations,
acting as reputation providers and requesters, following the
protocol of Fig. 3. ART designers considered reputation as
the information about the personal view of provider about
expected expertise of other appraiser agents. A reputation
transaction begins when a requester sends a ‘reputation
request’ message to a reputation provider, including the
agent about which it is requesting reputation information
and furthermore including the era of the expected expertise
it is asking for. Then, after the provider agent has received
a reputation request, it may send an accept or decline
message depending on whether it is willing to provide the
requested reputation (or even because it has no information
at all about the trustworthiness of the given agent and era).
If the provider accepted the transaction, then the requester
would send the corresponding payment to the provider in
order to receive the requested reputation information.
Finally, the provider is not required to send its actual
reputation value.
2.2 A fuzzy reputation model (AFRAS)
AFRAS (Carbo et al. 2003) agent adopts a socio-cognitive
approach to model trust and reputation of agents. AFRAS
continuously updates human-like mental attributes, expres-
sed in fuzzy terms to adjust their progressive and smooth
adaptation to the situations faced. These attributes are as
egoism, sociability, shyness, and susceptibility, included in
the agent reasoning. For instance, an agent would be acting
socially if it answer the requests from other agents, while
egoism decides whether to share or not the own knowledge or
abilities with other agents, shyness stands for the proactivity
of the agent asking for services, and finally susceptibility
represents how much suspicious is any agent about the
behaviour of others.
The internal reasoning followed by an AFRAS agent has
three different levels of abstraction as it is shown in Fig. 4.
They deal with world, social, and mental models. These
layers are designed in such a way that each layer is bottom-
up activated, and top-down executed. The former means
that the higher is a layer, more complex and abstract are its
Fig. 3 ART opinion and reputation transaction protocols
Environment
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susceptibility & 
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comitted intentions
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Social Model
MODIFIES
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Fig. 4 Conceptual model of reasoning in AFRAS agents
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competencies. The latter means that each layer uses the
predicates generated by the lower layer.
The top one, called mental level, is the most interesting
for this contribution since it involves the adaptation of the
mental attributes of the agent that characterise its behav-
iour. We have called them before as shyness, egoism,
susceptibility, and sociability. Its continuous adaptation
affect the computations of the world model layer and the
communicative decisions of the social layer and this is
where trust strategy belongs to, and therefore this is the
part we had to adapt to apply AFRAS model on ART
games. The social model level of abstraction would acti-
vate this control layer when the results of a service eval-
uation are available. These mental attitudes would change
according to the evolution of the results obtained by the
requested services.
Furthermore, AFRAS considers trust and reputation as a
fuzzy concept. This is conceptually justified because of the
uncertain nature of recommendation from others, of the
vague nature of evaluation of direct interactions that come
from humans, and the incomplete nature of the observation
of the agents (not all the actions of agents can be observed).
Therefore, we represent the opinion about agents in the
form of piece-wise fuzzy sets. We use an ad-hoc continu-
ous space of values [0,100] to draw up trapezoidal fuzzy
sets. We can guess that the use of fuzzy sets in trust models
may facilitate the task of monitoring soft changes of
behaviour. They are aggregated through a weighted mean
of fuzzy sets. Aggregation of fuzzy sets is computed with
Mass Assignment assumptions based on Baldwin’s (1992)
theory of evidence.
Additionally, reliability of trust beliefs is modelled
through the fuzzy sets themselves. It is implicit in them,
graphically we can interpret the gradient of the sides of a
trapezium representing a fuzzy set as its reliability. In this
way, a wide fuzzy set representing a given reputation
represents a high degree of uncertainty over that reputation
estimation, while a narrow fuzzy set implies a reliable
reputation.
In a similar way, recommendations are aggregated
directly with direct experiences as a weighted sum of fuzzy
sets. But in this case, the weight given to each part is
dependent on the trust held by the recommender.
This internal reasoning of agents has already been tested
in adhoc simulations from different perspectives: the con-
vergence of reputation (Carbo et al. 2003), the influence of
benevolent recommendations (Carbo et al. 2005), and
finally the dynamics of our system with a collusion of
malicious providers and recommenders (Carbo et al.
2007b). It has also been considered its application to
generic electronic services in the book E-Service Intelli-
gence—Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
(Carbo et al. 2007a) and it has been applied and compared
with the web service provided by MovieLens Website in
the International Journal of Web Engineering and Tech-
nology (Carbo and Molina 2004).
3 An extension of AFRAS to be applied in ART testbed
Any agent addressing trust problems has to implement
decisions on how to use trust and reputation information
(trust strategy), but AFRAS just comes up with updating
such information, not applying it. This means that we have
to extend AFRAS model, and in particular for the ART
domain, we have to implement the following decisions:
1. Whether or not asking for reputation of a service
provider (reputation request in ART terms) to other
given agent,
2. Whether or not answering a service (reputation/opin-
ion) request, and
3. Whether or not asking for a service (requesting an
opinion).
4. How much time (economic value) our agent should
spend building opinions to the ‘ask for opinions’
request about the paintings of the other agents
5. How much time (economic value) our agent should
spend building the appraisals of the own paintings
In the design of AFRAS internal reasoning schema,
these decisions should be taken in the world model layer
according to the particular state of the mental character-
isation of the agent, and they do not need to be changed.
However, the updating of egoism, sociability, and shyness,
that takes place in the mental layer has to be implemented
in order to act in ART games. This is a flaw of our pre-
viously-published and previously-tested AFRAS trust
model since it exclusively updates trust beliefs with direct
and indirect sources (noted in ART terms as opinions and
reputations) and susceptibility attribute.
Therefore, in this paper we design and implement a trust
strategy for extending AFRAS trust model to be used in
ART testbed. This extension consists of an ART ad hoc
instantiation of some of the above-mentioned human-like
attributes of AFRAS model: Shyness, egoism and socia-
bility. Susceptibility is excluded to this extension since it
belongs to the trust model (it only influences the adaptation
of trust updates with new information). It has to be noticed
that then the level of success of last prediction involved in
susceptibility updating remains being computed as a sim-
ilarity function of the overlapping between two fuzzy sets
that represents the prediction and the result obtained. But
since the result obtained is not anymore a fuzzy set and
although AFRAS trust model assumes that agents are
exchanging trust values in the form of piece-wise fuzzy
sets, this is not allowed in ART testbed (since exchanged
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data in ART communications are limited to float values
between zero and one). So we have overcome this limita-
tion transforming a float value in a very thin fuzzy triangle
centered in such float value of trust. By this way the
updating of susceptibility has not changed.
This trust strategy has to take into account the eco-
nomic incomes and expenses of ART games: the gener-
ation of appraisals for us (rewarded with a fixed
ClientFee for each painting), the investment in opinion
for others and finally providing and requesting opinions
and reputations. Requesting opinions to other appraiser
agents has a cost noted as OpinionCost (fixed in the
game design definition), and providing them has an
equivalent income. On the other hand, requesting/pro-
viding reputation has a cost/income of ReputationCost.
Since ReputationCost value (defined in ART competi-
tions as 1) is much lower than the OpinionCost (10) and
ClientFee (100), AFRAS agent always ask for reputation
to every agent in the system (there were a few number of
agents in the games of past competitions, this is one of
theflawsofthem (Gomezetal. 2007)). Additionally we want 
AFRAS agent to always accept all the relevant incomes
(ask-for-opinions rather than ask-for-reputa-tions).
Therefore, our agent is always completely soci-able, this
means that one of our mental attributes, Sociability, is
never adapted or updated, it has a maxi-mum value along
all the game. We chose these very simple decisions in
order to avoid much more noise in the results, since we
want to test just the convenience of AFRAS (at least as
much as we can) instead of the convenience of a
particular economic strategy.
So it still lacks the third of the economic decisions
included in the trust strategy: how many agents should ask
for opinions about its assigned paintings (each request costs
an OpinionCost value). In the AFRAS reasoning this
decision had to be taken using the Shyness mental attribute
of the agent, and we now have to decide how to update it.
We will update Shyness attribute through the following
guidelines:
• In the first timestep AFRAS agent would be not shy at
all since it requests all opinions but the worst one,
considering the worst one according to the certainties
received from the other agents in the game (agents
advertise its expertise in generating opinions to the
requesting agents before the opinion request is
confirmed).
• In the next timestep AFRAS agent asks for opinion of
every interesting agent, where Interesting is defined
below.
Interesting agents are the first ones in an ordered list by
their reputation. We assume the statement that number of
interesting agents has to be decreased as much as the
overall level of success of the agent estimating the real
value of the paintings is increased. This level of real suc-
cess is represented in Remembrance variable from the last
increment of the number of assigned paintings (# of
appraisals). This number is proportional to the quality of
the agent results in the past iteration, and it is decided for
each agent by the internal computations of the ART sys-
tem. We can also consider Remembrance as the general
confidence of the agent on all of its own beliefs in a par-
ticular timestep (i).
Remembrancei ¼ #of appraisalsi
#of appraisalsi1
ð1Þ
Then, the computation of the number of interesting agents
is obtained from the defuzzyfication of the union of the
next fuzzy sets corresponding to the Shyness of the agent in
a timestep i:
FzShynessi ¼unionfFzShynessi1g
f½0; 0½#agents  1  Remembrancei; 1
½#agents; 0g
#of interestingagentsi ¼ defuzzifyfFzShynessig
where there are several ways to implement a defuzzifica-
tion function (centroid of area, bisector of area, mean value
of the maximum, etc.). We chose a centroid defuzzification
method. The next (forth) economic decision of our trust
strategy is: how much time (economic value) our agent
should spend building opinions to the ‘ask for opinions’
request about the paintings of the other agents. In the
AFRAS model this decision was taken using the Egoism
mental attribute of the agent. In the corresponding exten-
sion of AFRAS this economic decision is updated through
the following guidelines:
• In the first timestep our agent is not egoist at all since it
spends much time building such answers (opinions for
the other agents). This implies a great economic
investment to build a high initial reputation of our
agent for the others.
• And gradually time spent building opinions (economic
inversion) depends upon the Remembrance value and
upon the economic efficiency (relative benefits per
appraisal, noted OpportunityCost) obtained by the agent.
Opportunity costs value is computed from the potential
benefit we could have obtained without any expenses
asking for opinions:
OpportunityCosti ¼¼ 1 
ðBankBalanceInciÞ
#of Appraisalsi  ClientFee
;
ð2Þ
where ClientFee is the amount an agent receives for each
appraisal (fixed in advance by ART system) and the
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relative difference between the BankBalance in two
sequential timesteps is BankBalanceInc. Now we
take into account the last level of success and the
efficiency of our agent to compute the egoism value of
timestep i:
Egoism ¼ ClientFee
OpinionCost
 Remembrancei
 OpportunityCosti ð3Þ
where OpinionCost is the amount that any agent has to pay
to other agents for obtaining an opinion about a painting
(also fixed in advance by ART system). And this crisp
value is fuzzified as we did with shyness, and then, we
apply a union operation between the last fuzzy egoism and
the previous ones:
FzEgoismi ¼unionfFzEgoismi1g
½0; 0½Egoism; 1 ClientFee
OpinionCost
; 0
  
This fuzzy set will be used to decide the quantity of time to
be invested in the opinion generation of timestep i
(ExternalInvest):
ExternalInvesti ¼ OpinionCost  DefuzzifyðFzEgoismiÞ
ð4Þ
Here again the defuzzification method is computed from
the centroid of the area. The last one (fifth) of the economic
decisions that belongs to our trust strategy is how much
time (economic value) our agent should spend building the
appraisals of the own paintings. Our approach follows
the general balancing rule that implies investing more in
the eras were more is needed. We will need to invest more
in the eras where we lack our expertise (OwnExpertise)
plus the expected expertise provided by other agents
(ExpectedExpertise). Therefore Necessity is defined from
the total accumulated expertise about the corresponding
painting.
Necessityj¼
#AgentsOwnExpertisejExpectedExpertisej
#Agents
ð5Þ
Then the time invested building our opinions about our
own painting j (InternalInvest) is computed from:
InternalInvestj ¼ ClientFee
OpinionCost
 ð1 þ NecessityjÞ ð6Þ
4 AFRAS tests in ART games
An implementation of AFRAS trust model was presented
to 2006 international ART competition. The results
obtained by this agent in such competition were not
impressive (12th position over 17 registered agents), as
Table 1 shows.
Due to these disappointing results we could argue
whether fuzzy representation makes sense when we use
reputation information to infer trust or not. However, it is
not clear how much benefits come from strategic trust
decisions (and their particular instantiation explained here)
rather than the classical trust decisions (just updating
information with direct/indirect experiences), and further-
more and how much come from the fuzzy representation.
Following some of the current discussion about how to
obtain more detailed conclusions for the next ART com-
petitions of ART testbed (Gomez et al. 2007), we have
designed and run specific ART games to give an approxi-
mated response to both questions: relevance of trust strat-
egy and of fuzzy representation.
From our point of view, one of the most relevant design
failures of past ART competitions is the lack of necessity
of reputation transactions (in fact, the winner, IAM
(LukeTeacy et al. 2007), did not use them at all). ART
developers tried to solve this problem (from 2006 to 2007
competition) increasing the scalability of ART testbed
(Team 2007b).
According to both documents (Gomez et al. 2007; Team
2007b) we chose to apply a very different initial setup of
the games from the competitive ones, that we think would
overcome partially the problem of uselessness of the rep-
utation transactions. These changes are:
• We set the number of eras to 10 rather than 5, and the
number of initial appraisals to 5 rather than 20. By
these values, it is harder to acquire enough direct
knowledge from opinions (since there are more eras to
know about, and less initial paintings to evaluate), and
then reputation is much required than before.
• We set the opinion cost to 50 rather than 10. Then
reputation transactions is worth, since opinion transac-
tions are much more expensive.
Table 1 2006 ART competition results
Rank Average
score
Agent
name
Team
representative
Team affiliation
1 132321 IAM Huynh Univ. Southampton
2 123008 joey Thiel Univ. Nebraska
3 121443 neil Weng Nanyang Tech. Univ.
4 116464 frost Kafali Bogazici Univ.
…
12 92796 AFRAS Carbo Univ. Carlos III
…
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4.1 ART games proving the suitability of fuzzy
representation
Since the main point of our proposal is the use of a fuzzy
representation of trust and of the agent’s mental charac-
terization, we would like to observe the influence of the
fuzziness much more than the overall comparison with
other trust models held in ART competitions. Therefore,
we though that a way to test such influence is to observe the
relative differences of behaviour with a crisp clone of our
AFRAS agent when this new agent (we will call it ACRAS,
A Crisp Reputation Agent System) faces the same games
of the international ART competitions. Although AFRAS
just participated in 2006 competition (under the name of
Fzjcarbo), we used the finalist agents of 2007 competition
and the enhanced version of the testbed of 2007. We did it
because the same university (Southampton) won both years
(with IAM and IAM2), and due to the enhancements of the
testbed that did not avoid the participation of the agents
from 2006 as our Fzjcarbo agent. Unfortunately 2006 and
2007 agents do not run in the last version of 2008. The
compiled code of all the participants in the competitions,
and the testbed itself are publicly available in the ART
website.2 The 2007 top participants were those of Table 2.
Therefore to build the crisp equivalent to AFRAS, we
had to transform each fuzzy variable and each fuzzy
computation into an equivalent crisp one. So then the
computation of shyness from:
FzShynessi ¼unionfFzShynessi1g
f½0; 0½#agents  1  Remembrancei; 1
½#agents; 0g
is defuzzified as follows:
Shynessi ¼ ðShynessi1 þ #agents  1
 RemembranceiÞ=2 ð7Þ
The computation of egoism from:
FzEgoismi ¼unionfFzEgoismi1g
½0; 0½Egoism; 1 ClientFee
OpinionCost
  
…goes into:
Egoismi ¼ ðEgoismi1 þ EgoismÞ=2 ð8Þ
where the weighted sums of fuzzy sets corresponding to the
reputation aggregation, and trust updating of providers and
recommenders (from opinion responses, reputation
responses, and real value of paintings) are straightly con-
verted into weighted sums of float trust values. Further-
more, all the similarity computations obtained from the
overlapping of fuzzy sets are converted into a simple dif-
ference between two float values.
Once the crisp version of AFRAS was ready, we run two
series of the same ART games (facing the 2007 competi-
tion finalists) of 10 timesteps with both alternative agents,
the fuzzy original one (AFRAS) and the crisp clone
(ACRAS). In the Fig. 5 we can observe a capture from the
ART interface with the corresponding Bank Balances of a
sample of these games, where AFRASArt obtained the last
position with 2503 and the winner (IAM) obtained 6523.
We obtained the next average result (the bank balance
means and their standard deviations) of 50 games in
Table 3.
From these very close results between AFRAS and
ACRAS facing the best agents of 2007 competition, we
compute a comparison of means (t test) in order to state the
significance of hypothesis H0: l1 = l2 since the difference
in mean shows just a slightly better results for AFRAS.
Table 2 Publicly available 2007 ART registered agents
Agent name Team representative Team affiliation
IAM Luke Teacy Univ. Southampton
jam Anil Gursel Univ. Tulsa
zecariocales Andrew Diniz Pontificia Univ. Rio de Janeiro
spartan Nicolas Hormazabal Univ. of Girona
artgente Mikalai Sabel Univ. Trento
uno Victor Muoz Univ. of Girona
reneil Jianshu Weng Nanyang Tech. Univ.
marmota Javier Murillo Univ. of Girona
Fig. 5 Sample game with AFRAS and the finalists of 2007 ART
competition
2 http://www.art-testbed.net
Table 3 20 ART games results
Agent name Earnings mean Earnings Std Dev
ACRASArt 2704.1 800.87
AFRASArt 2811.85 772
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Therefore, considering a (approximately) normal distribu-
tion centered in zero for H0 : dx ¼ 0; we compute:
dx ¼ x1  x2 ¼ 2811:85  2704:1 ¼ 107:75 ð9Þ
where standard deviation of dx is:
sdx ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
r21
n1
þ r
2
2
n2
s
ð10Þ
where it results:
sdx ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
7722
50
þ 800:87
2
50
r
¼ 157:31 ð11Þ
And then the condition to accept H0 would be:
dx Z  sdx ð12Þ
where considering a significance of 99% (a = 0.01), and
the corresponding Za of 2.58, we can find out:
107:75 2:58  157:31 ¼ 405:87 ð13Þ
And therefore we cannot state a relevant difference
between AFRAS and ACRAS Bank Balance means.
4.2 ART games proving the relevance of trust strategy
over trust model
One of the reasons we found for the ART competition
results was that AFRAS agent was defined as a trust model
rather than a trust strategy. The focus of AFRAS (and our
general point of view about trust models) is to find the way
to form the right valuation about others from direct expe-
riences and indirect references rather than finding the right
way to use them in the most efficient way (trust strategy).
Since ART competition design did not distinguish between
them, we thought in a way to reduce the influence of trust
strategy over trust model decisions through the game setup
and through the implementation of the agent participants.
By both ways we would not change a line in the code of
ART testbed itself.
In ART competitions, agents acted jointly as provider
and client roles, and we think that these multiple roles of
agents may be disturbing ART results to show which
participant was the best one just modelling the trust of
other agents. One way to reduce the influence of trust
strategy over trust model is to avoid agent participants
acting as providers of opinions. But since ART code
includes this possibility of agents, we will isolate both roles
by the behaviour of the agents participants. Therefore, in
our ART games we implement just pair-wise comparisons.
They include a variant of our AFRAS agent of the 2006
competition adapted to 2007 games and it does not act as
provider: AFRASArt (it provides a zero opinion certainty
to every opinion certainty request), and additionally we
include the winner of the competition, IAM (LukeTeacy et
al. 2007) from University of Southampton, just as it was in
2007 competition. Since we cannot modify the source code
of IAM agent, the only way to avoid IAM acting as provider
is to avoid any agent in the game to ask him for opinions. So
we also add an ad hoc modification into our AFRASArt
agent in order to specifically not asking IAM agent for
opinions. And finally, all the other agents that fill the game
(we will call them ‘predefined agents’), are non participants
in the comparison, they are designed to provide opinions to
IAM and AFRASArt agents and to not asking both of them
for opinions. Consequently AFRASArt and IAM do not act
as providers of opinions to others in our games, so their
earnings are not obtained providing opin-ions to other
agents.
However, we are not avoiding completely the provider
role of IAM agent since it still invests in their own
appraisals (it was designed to do it, and we cannot access to
IAM agent source code, but we know how much they invest
in them from (LukeTeacy et al. 2007)). So, we decide that
AFRASArt also may invest in own appraisals, and that a
way to minimise the relevance of this investment on the
own appraisals of IAM is to increase very much the
investment of some of the predefined agents (the ones we
will called ‘honest’) when they generate opinions for
anyone. So the possibility of counting on much better
evaluations of paintings from others would reduce the final
relevance of this acting as providers of IAM and
AFRASArt agents.
Through the use of two opposite types of predefined
agents, bad and honest agents, we intend to push IAM and
AFRASArt agents to filter out bad agents when asking for
opinions, while to promote asking for opinions to honest
agents. Since both types compute and exchange internal
true trust values in reputation transactions, then reputation
transactions are more useful than they were in past ART
competitions, where many participant agents share false
information about third parties in reputation transactions.
Specifically these two types of predefined agents in our
games behave in the following ways:
• Honest agents, who provide very high-quality opinions
(investing twice the opinion cost), and ask for opinions
to all the other agents (but IAM and IMM agents),
computing trust as an average sum of opinions
provided. They do not ask for reputation of third
parties, but they provide honestly their trust values
when they are asked for the reputation of third parties.
• Bad agents, who are similar to the honest ones, but they
provide very low-quality opinions (investing the mini-
mum value allowed). As they provide honest trust values
in the reputation transactions, they are considered just
bad agents (as if they would have very low expertise
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values in all the eras) rather than malicious, since they
compute (and exchange) trust values of third parties (as
reputation responses) in the same honest way that the so
called honest agents did.
Below we show a figure (Fig. 6) from the ART interface
of a sample game with IAM, AFRAS, 4 honest, and 4 bad
agents.
Since a single game is not significant, Table 4 shows the
bank balance means and standard deviations of 50 games
we run with 4 honest agents, 4 bad agents jointly with IAM
and AFRAS agents.
Computing again t test on the difference of these means,
for a (approximately) normal distribution centered in zero
for H0 : dx ¼ 0; we find out:
dx ¼ x1  x2 ¼ 2391:6  1635:75 ¼ 755:85 ð14Þ
sdx ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
338:132
50
þ 687:65
2
50
r
¼ 108:37 ð15Þ
And therefore the acceptance of H0; considering a
significance of 99%ða ¼ 0:01Þ; and the corresponding Za
of 2.58, it results:
755:85 [ 2:58  108:37 ¼ 279:59 ð16Þ
As these data show, the bank balances of IAM agent and
AFRAS agent are different enough, although their means
are slightly more close than in the official competition
(28% of relative distance between them rather than 30%).
We can guess that the authors of IAM could argue that
this is not a fair comparison since we have modified the
environment conditions of the game (although using the
same ART testbed code). Obviously if the authors of IAM
agent have previously known the setup of this different
kind of game, then they might implement changes in IAM
agent to include an ad hoc trust strategy to the new setup.
But our point was not about claiming anything about its
winning position in 2007 competition.
Instead of it, these 50 games intend to point out that
avoiding part of the economic incomes (those that come
from the role of providers) and that promoting reputation
utility, ART testbed games may be (at least a bit) more
accurate. And particularly from our view, these games tried
to show whether AFRAS principles may be used as a
reasonably good trust model or as a reasonably good trust
strategy. But these results are not decisive for any of these
clauses. We just saw that AFRAS model and strategy share
both in similar ways the responsibility of the disappointing
results of AFRAS in the 2006 ART competition. This
conclusion could be even considered a surprise since an
analogous study over a participant agent that used IMM
filter as working core showed relevant differences between
the results of its trust model over its trust strategy (Carbo
et al. 2008).
5 Conclusions
Due to the increasing number of Web services, there is a
need of an automated way of inferring their reliability (trust
on them). Agent technology seems to be the right approach
when trust depends on peer to peer opinions. In this line,
the outstanding Agent Reputation and Trust (ART) initia-
tive had a significant acceptation in providing a tool for
computing fair comparisons of trust models. However,
some shortcomings of ART testbed view were pointed out.
The inclusion of our fuzzy-based AFRAS trust model into
an ART participant agent was therefore justified. Although
the original trust model was widely published and tested
some time ago (Carbo et al. 2003), and its application to the
ART testbed meant significant extensions and modifi-
cations that were described in this paper. This new agent
that includes the extension of AFRAS model was tested in
the ART games corresponding to the Spanish and the
international competitions held in 2006.
The intention of overcoming the disappointing results
obtained by the AFRAS extension to the ART domain rules
in these competitions, drove us to design two different
ART games to evaluate in some way the positive influence
of a fuzzy representation in this context, and the strength of
the dependence of the results on the trust strategy rather
Fig. 6 Sample game with IAM,
AFRAS, 4 honest, and 4 bad
agents
Table 4 20 ART games results
Agent name Earnings means Std Dev
IAM 2391.6 338.13
AFRAS 1635.75 687.65
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than the trust model (which was supposed to be the strong
point of AFRAS). Unfortunately the results of these games
did not provide us enough encouragement for both state-
ments. In spite of that, we think that our fuzzy approxi-
mation to the trust problem still makes sense and we hope
that future enhancements of the testbed platform and rules
would contribute to a better clarification on the results that
ART games are measuring.
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